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Recent Decisions
PATENT LAW - INFRINGEMENT - DocTRIE OF EQUIVALENTS -
PROSECUTION HISTORY ESTOPPEL - The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the doctrine of equivalents is not inconsistent with
the Patent Act; that the doctrine of equivalents is to be applied to
individual elements of a patent claim as opposed to the invention
as a whole; that prosecution history estoppel applies to all changes
made to an application during prosecution in the form of a
rebuttable presumption against the patentee that can be overcome
with a sufficient showing that the change was not relevant to
patentability.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct.
1040 (1997).
In 1985, the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO")'
issued Patent Number 4,560,746 to Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
("Hilton"). 2 This patent disclosed3 a purification process for the
ultrafiltration of dyes through a porous membrane within a range
of specified pore sizes, pressures and pH4 limits. 5 In 1986,
Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc. ("Warner") began using an ultrafiltration
process that operated within the same specified pore sizes and
1. The United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), an agency of the
Department of Commerce, was established to perform "all duties required by law respecting
the granting and issuing of patents and the registration of trademarks." 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1996).
2. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct 1040, 1045 (1997)
(-Warner").
3. "Disclosure" in the context of patent law means to reveal "the specification; the
statement of the subject matter of the invention [or process], or the manner in which it
operates." BiAciKs LAw DICTONARY 464 (6th ed. 1990).
4. "pH" measures the negative logarithm of the effective hydrogen-ion concentration or
hydrogen-ion activity in gram equivalents per liter used in expressing both acidity and
alkalinity on a scale of values from 0 to 14, with 7 representing neutrality. WEBSra's NINTH
NEw CouEGIATE DIcIoNARY 880 (9th ed. 1983). Values less than 7 indicate increasing acidity;
values greater than 7 indicate increasing alkalinity. Id.
5. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1045.
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pressures as the Hilton process, but outside the literal pH limit
specified in the claims of Hilton's patent.6 Following Warner's initial
commercial use of its ultrafiltration process, Hilton learned of the
similarities between the two processes and sued Warner, in 1991,
for patent infringement in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio.7 The district court determined that the
Hilton patent was not invalid8 and held that Warner infringed the
patent under the "doctrine of equivalents."9 The jury found,
however, that Warner had not acted willfully, and thus, awarded
Hilton $3,564,705, an amount representing 20% of the requested
damages.10 After denying Warner's post-trial motion, the district
court entered judgment in favor of Hilton." Furthermore, the court
imposed a permanent injunction against Warner, prohibiting it from
practicing ultrafiltration except at pressures and pH levels above
those covered in the Hilton patent.
12
Warner appealed both the patent validity and infringement
findings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit.1 3 Initially, a three-judge panel heard oral arguments in the
6. Id., 117 S. CL at 1046. During the prosecution of the Hilton patent, the claims
relating to the pH limits of the process were amended to read "approximately 6.0 to 9.0."
Warner designed its process to operate at a pH of 5.0. Id.
7. "Infringement" of a patent is the unauthorized maldng, using or selling, for practical
use or for profit, of an invention covered by a valid claim of a patent during the life of the
patent BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 781 (6th ed. 1990). See also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
8. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 64 F3d 675 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
("Hilton M"). The jury found the Hilton patent valid because it was "nonobvious over the
asserted prior art, not invalid for failure to name the correct inventors, and not invalid for
failure to disclose the best mode." Id. An issued patent is always presumed valid. 35 U.S.C.
§ 282 (1996). The burden of establishing invalidity in an infringement suit is on the asserting
party (usually the defendant). Id.
9. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F3d 1512, 1515 (Fed. Cir.
1995) ("Hilton I"). The Supreme Court originally announced the "doctrine of equivalents" in
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853). This doctrine has evolved into a comparison of
insubstantial differences between the claimed and accused (alleged infringing) product or
process, using the tripartite test established in Graver 7ank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air
Products, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). The Graver test is commonly abridged to "function, way,
result." Hilton II, 62 F3d at 1517-18. The doctrine of equivalents permits a patentee to allege
non-literal infringement. Graver Tnk, 339 U.S. at 607-08. Prior to trial, Hilton conceded that
there was no literal infringement of its claims by Warner, relying solely on the doctrine of
equivalents in arguing its claim of infringement Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1043.
10. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117
S. Ct 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
11. Hilton II, 62 F3d at 1553 (Nies, J., dissenting). The court denied Warner's renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law. Id.
12. Id. at 1516. The district court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting Warner
from practicing ultrafiltration except at pressures higher than 500 pounds per square inch
gauge ("p.s.Lg") and pHts higher than 9.01.
13. Id. Congress established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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summer of 1993.14 In December 1993, the court, en banc,'5 acting
sua sponte,"8 ordered a rehearing of the appeal "to consider the
important issues raised concerning the doctrine of equivalents."
17
The en banc court ordered supplemental briefs from the parties on
the following questions:
(1) Does a finding of patent infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
require anything in addition to proof of the facts that there are the same or
substantially the same (a) function, (b) way, and (c) result, the so-called
triple identity test of Graver Tank v. Linde Air Product Co., 339 U.S. 605, 85
USPQ 328 (1950), and cases relied on therein? If yes, what?
(2) Is application of the doctrine of equivalents by the trial court to find
infringement of the patentee's right to exclude, when there is no literal
infringement of a claim, discretionary in accordance with the circumstances
of the case?
(3) Is the issue of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents an
equitable remedy to be decided by the court, or is it, like literal
infringement, an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury in a jury case? 8
On August 8, 1995, a divided Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's decision,
holding that:
(1) [the] finding of infringement under [the] doctrine of equivalents requires
proof of insubstantial differences between claimed and accused products or
processes; (2) infringement under the doctrine of equivalents is [an] issue of
fact to be submitted to [the] jury ... ; (3) [the] trial judge does not have
discretion to choose whether to apply the'doctrine of equivalents when the
records show no literal infringement; and (4) [Warner's] dye purification
method infringed [Hilton's] patented method under the doctrine of
equivalents.
19
The validity of the Hilton patent was also affirmed by the same
panel of judges that had previously heard the initial oral arguments
in 1982 to provide greater uniformity in the administration of patent laws by granting this
forum exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases. ALEx CH w Ova. 1997 FEDsM
CiRcurr YEARBOOK Xox (1997).
14. Id.
15. In an "en banc" proceeding, the entire membership of the court participates in the
decision, rather than the regular quorum. BLAcK's LAw DicTIoNARY 528 (6th ed. 1990). In the
United States, circuit courts usually sit in "Panels" of judges (usually numbering three or
five), but in important cases, the court may expand the panel to include the full membership.
Id, In Warner, twelve members composed the en banc court. Hilton 11, 62 F.3d at 1514.
16. A court acts "sua sponte" when it acts on "its own will or motion; voluntarily;
without prompting or suggestions." BLAcies LAw DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
17. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 45 E3d 442 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
("Hilton I").
18. Id.
19. Hilton II, 62 F3d at 1512.
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and was reported in a separate opinion issued on the same date.20
The decision of the Federal Circuit consisted of a per curiam2'
opinion, a concurring opinion, and three dissenting opinions,
alternately joined by a total of five judges.22 Subsequently, Warner
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.23
In granting Warner's petition,24  the Supreme Court first
considered the issue of whether the doctrine of equivalents, as set
forth in Graver Tank, is consistent with Congress' 1952 revision of
the Patent Act.25 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas
observed that three of the four points raised by Warner were not
unique to this case and had already been decided by the Court.26 In
reviewing the Court's previous holdings on these three arguments,
Justice Thomas concluded that there was no reason to reach a
different conclusion in the immediate case.
27
The fourth point raised by Warner concerned Congress' intent in
enacting Title 35 U.S.C. section 112, paragraph 6.28 The text of this
provision states that an applicant can describe an element in a
combination claim29 as a means for performing a specified function
20. Hilton III, 64 F3d at 675.
21. A "per curiam" opinion is an unattributed unanimous opinion of a court, as
opposed to an opinion written by a single judge. BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Hilton II, 62 F.3d at 1514.
23. A "writ of certiorari" is a discretionary order issued by an appellate court to a
lower court, requesting that it certify the record of the proceeding below. BLAciKs LAw
DIcnoNARY 1609 (6th ed. 1990). The Supreme Court of the United States grants review based
on a writ of certiorari only when the Court believes compelling reasons exist mandating
review. Id.; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1254, 1257 (1996).
24. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996). The
Court granted Warner's petition for certiorari in February 1996. Id.
25. Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1047. The Patent Act is located at Title 35 U.S.C. sections
1-376 (1996). Warner raised the issue of inconsistency under the provisions beginning at
section 100 of the Act. Id.
26. Id. at 1047-48. In Graver Tank, Justice Black raised these same three arguments in
his dissent (1) the doctrine of equivalents is inconsistent with the Patent Act; (2) the
doctrine of equivalents bypasses the reissue process and avoids the limitations on the scope
of reissue; and (3) the doctrine of equivalents conflicts with the duty of the patent office to
establish the scope of the claims. Id.
The reissue process disallows reissue of a patent if the scope of the claims of the original
patent is enlarged, unless the holder applies for reissue "within two years from the grant of
the original patent" 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1996).
27. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1048.
28. Id. This provision was not contained in the original 1870 Patent Act, but was
enacted in response to Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
Section 112 requires the inclusion of the written "disclosure" (the specification) in a patent
application. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1996).
29. A "combination claim" contains more than one element. ROBERT C. FABES, LANDIS
ON MECHANICS OF CLAIM DRArING §§ 9, 34 (1990).
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without reciting the structure or material needed to perform that
function.3° Furthermore, such a claim is construed to cover the
corresponding structure (or material), and its equivalents.31 The
Court recognized this as an express endorsement of "means plus
function" claims, with the restrictive limitation that "the broad
literal language of such claims [will] be limited to only those means
which are 'equivalent' to the actual means shown in the
specification."32 Justice Thomas characterized this legislation as "an
application of the doctrine of equivalents in a restrictive role which
functions to narrow the application of broad literal claim
elements," but he further added that the statute is silent on the
subject of non-literal infringement.33
While Warner argued that the language of section 112, paragraph
6 signified Congressional intent to limit the doctrine of equivalents
to literal claim elements and the "equivalents" of the means shown
in the patent specification, the Court found that "such limited
congressional action should not be overread for negative
implication."' Coupling this analysis with the fact that Congress
failed for more than four decades to legislate this type of
restriction on the doctrine of equivalents, Justice Thomas
concluded that there is no conflict between the judicially-created
doctrine of equivalents and the Patent Act.35
Providing notice to the public through delineation of the "metes
and bounds"36 of an invention has always been the price that a
patentee must pay in return for receiving a patent and the
corresponding right to exclude others from practicing their claimed
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1996). Paragraph 6 provides, in full
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. FABER, supra note 29 at §§ 34, 45, 58 (1990). The language of paragraph 6 of 35
U.S.C. section 112 has specifically been interpreted to allow definition of an element by what
it does, rather than by what it is. Id. This method of claim drafting is commonly referred to
as "means plus function" claiming Id.
32. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1048.
33. I (emphasis added).
34. Id. Justice Thomas described Congress' action as a "targeted cure to a specific
problem" because this section was added in response to Halliburton Oil. Id.
35. Id.
36. "Metes and bounds" traditionally described the boundary lines of land, including
their terminal points and angles, by listing the compass directions and distances of the
boundaries. BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 991 (6th ed. 1990). This phrase is also used to describe
the periphery of a specific patent's coverage Id.
1997
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invention. 7 The Supreme Court acknowledged the concerns raised
in the dissenting opinions of the Federal Circuit on this issue.3s
Specifically, Justice Thomas found that a broad application of the
doctrine of equivalents is at odds with the statutory requirements
of the Patent Act. 9 The Patent Act provides that the applicant must
describe the subject matter of his invention with particularity in the
patent application.40 In order to reconcile the Court's holding that
the doctrine of equivalents does not conflict with the Patent Act,
and the statement that a broad application of the doctrine of
equivalents would conflict with specific statutory requirements of
that same Act, Justice Thomas relied on Judge Nies' dissenting
opinion in the Federal Circuit case.
41
In her dissent, Judge Nies advocated application of the doctrine
of equivalents on an element-by-element basis as a means of
harmonizing opposing holdings.42 Judge Nies acknowledged that
any finding of infringement by equivalents effectively enlarges the
literal claims of the patent to cover unclaimed subject matter.43 She
distinguished the substitution of an equivalent component from
enlarging the scope of the invention beyond what is claimed. 44 In
the former case, the doctrine of equivalents is relevant - the latter
case is reserved for PTO reexamination. 4 Under this approach, if
the doctrine of equivalents is confined to comparing substituted
elements in combination (as opposed to comparing overall
.37. Among other things, a patent grants the patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention for a specified period of time. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1996). All of the rights granted by a United States patent are listed in this
statute. Id.
38. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1048-49.
39. Id at 1049. Justice Thomas referred to both the public notice requirement of the
Patent Act in 35 U.S.C. section 112, para. 1 and the requirement to describe the invention in
35 U.S.C. section 112, para. 2. Broad application of the doctrine of equivalents would
circumvent both requirements. Id.
40. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1996). "The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention." Id,
41. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1049. "This view that the accused device or process must be
more than equivalent overall reconciles the Supreme Court's position on infringement by
equivalents with its concurrent statements that the courts have no right to enlarge a patent
beyond the scope of its claims as allowed by the Patent Office." Id
42. Hilton 11, 62 F3d at 1573-74.
43. Id. at 1573.
44. Id.
45. I& Sections 1.501 through 1.570 of Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations
("C.ER.) specify the procedures for reexamination of patents. When the commissioner
determines the existence of a substantial new question of patentability, a reexamination may
be made. 37 C.FR. § 1.515 (1996).
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equivalence of the invention) the scope of the claims is not
enlarged.4 Each individual element thus becomes a material part of
the definition of the scope of the patented invention. 47 The Court
expressly adopted this approach by finding that the doctrine of
equivalents is not applicable to an invention as a whole.4
The Court also addressed the issue of "prosecution history
estoppel"4 and the limits estoppel imposes on the doctrine of
equivalents.5 Warner raised several arguments supporting
application of prosecution hisiory estoppel more consistently and
restrictively than was previously the custom in the lower courts.5 1
Warner proposed that any surrender of subject matter during the
prosecution of a patent application should prevent a patentee from
reclaiming that matter as equivalent (and therefore, infringing)
during a later procedure.52 The Court rejected this proposition,
finding that the reason for the change must be considered when
applying estoppel doctrine.3 Only patentability-related amendments
prevent an applicant from subsequently reclaiming the excluded
subject matter as equivalent.4
The Court also evaluated the burden of proving the purpose for a
proposed amendment made during the prosecution of the
application.5 The Court reasoned that a rebuttable presumption
against the patent applicant placed the burden where it belonged.M
Therefore, where no purpose for the amendment is clearly
documented in the record, it will be presumed that "the PTO had a
46. Hilton II, 62 E3d at 1574.
47. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
48. Id, In her dissent, Judge Nies stated that "Ja]n infringing product or process may
also be referred to as an 'equivalent' of the invention, but more than overall equivalency is
required." Hilton II, 62 F3d at 1573-74. Judge Nies provided the following example: "[w]hile
a ballpoint and fountain pen may be equivalent overall, they are not equivalent in the sense
of the doctrine of equivalents because their components are not equivalent" Id at 1574.
49. Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1050-51. "Prosecution history estoppel" is
lain equitable tool for determining the permissible scope of patent claims. It limits the
scope of patent claims based on arguments and claim amendments made during
prosecution [of a patent application] to obtain allowance of a patent The doctrine
applies both to claim amendments to overcome rejections based on prior art, and to
arguments submitted to obtain the patent.
BLAcics LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted).
50. Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1049.
51. Brief for Petitioner at 31-40, Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
117 S. Ct 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
52. Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1049.
53. Id, at 1050.
54. Id
55. Id. at 1051.
56. Id,
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substantial reason related to patentability for including [any]
limiting element by amendment."57 When this presumption survives,
and proof to the contrary is not forthcoming, prosecution history
estoppel bars the application of the doctrine of equivalents to the
amended element.58 In applying this holding to the facts of the
instant case, Justice Thomas remanded the issue to the Federal
Circuit for probing the reasons underlying the limiting amendment
to Hilton's patent.69
Warner proposed that intent should further restrict application of
the doctrine of equivalents. 60 Justice Thomas reviewed the Supreme
Court's application of the doctrine of equivalents in Graver Tank1
and the cases following, concluding that the doctrine of equivalents
is intent-neutral. 62 He acknowledged that the doctrine prevents
copying and piracy, but refused to limit its application to
circumstances of intentional acts by the alleged infringer.63 Justice
Thomas recounted the intent-neutral history of the doctrine to
explain why the doctrine should not be interpreted to prevent only
copying and piracy.64
The Court then turned to Warner's proposition that the best way
to satisfy the public notice function of patent claims is to limit any
equivalents to those elements either disclosed within the patent
specification itself or known at the time the patent was issued.6
Justice Thomas dispensed with both proposals by noting that the
57. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
58. Id.
59. Id. On June 12, 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit further
remanded the issue of the rebuttable presumption back to the district court for additional
fact-finding on the issue of whether Hilton could establish a reason for the amendment
(adding the lower pH limit) unrelated to patentability. Hilton Davis Chen. Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 114 F3d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("Hilton IV").
60. Brief for Petitioner at 32-33, Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc, v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
117 S. Ct 1040 (1997) (No. 95-728).
61. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
62. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1052.
63. Id at 1051.
64. I at 1051-52. Justice Thomas, quoting Winans v. Denmead, stated that "the claim
extends to the thing patented, however, its form or proportions may be varied." Id, at 1051
(quoting Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 343 (1853)). He appeared to give very
broad scope to the Winans Court's use of the word "however" to include not only piracy and
copying, but also unintentional infringements. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1051-52.
65. Id at 1052. Warner raised this point in its brief to the Court, based on sound
patent policy. Warner argued that subject matter that is not known on the issue date of the
patent, but is developed later and then found equivalent, should be available to the
discoverer, rather than to the developer of the old claimed equivalent subject matter. Brief
for Petitioner at 38-39, Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chen. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040
(1997) (No. 95-728).
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best time for determining equivalence under the doctrine is at the
time of infringement, not at the time the patent was issued.6 In
rejecting Warner's proposed limit, Justice Thomas summarily
rejected the proposition that equivalents must be restricted to those
disclosed within the patent specification.
67
Finally, the Court addressed the linguistic framework used to
determine "equivalence" when applying the doctrine of
equivalents.6 Justice Thomas acknowledged that the three
dissenting opinions in the Federal Circuit concerned whether the
tripartite test of "function, way, result" was the best method of
determining equivalence, or whether the "insubstantial differences"
approach might be superior.w He concluded that the linguistic
framework of either test is less important than whether the applied
test makes the essential inquiry into equivalence.70 Specifically, the
question the Court posed is: "Does the accused product or process
contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of
the patented invention?" 71 Because this question was not addressed
by the Federal Circuit, the Court reversed and remanded on this
issue.72 With this pronouncement, the Court provided a principal
inquiry for the lower courts to refine the test for equivalence on a
case by case basis73
A concurring opinion by Justice Ginsburg74 raised a cautionary
note regarding the application of the rebuttable presumption
created by the Court 75 Justice Ginsburg was concerned that the
presumption imposes a new duty on patent applicants. 76 All the
66. Id, at 1053. The Court restated its holding in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
"[a]n applicant . . . is not required to predict all future developments which enable the
practice of his invention in substantially the same way." Id. (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
United States, 717 F2d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
67. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1053. It is only logical that if the Court had decided that the
best time to determine equivalence is at the time of infringement (rather than at an earlier
point), it is impossible to restrict equivalents to only those elements disclosed in the patent
specification.




72. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1054.
73. Id. On June 12, 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, on remand,
reafmrmed its earlier holding that a pH of 5.0 is equivalent to a pH of "approximately 6.0," in
the context of the claimed process. Hilton IV, 114 E3d at 1164.
74. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1054 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg was joined
in concurrence by Justice Kennedy.




reasons for any modification to the file wrapper must now be fully
documented if evidence is subsequently needed to avoid the
presumption that the change was made solely for reasons of
patentability." Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the lower courts
will be required to consider the past lack of incentive for an
applicant to fulfill this duty.8 In the instant case, Justice Ginsburg
followed Justice Thomas' approach and deferred to the lower
courts' wisdom and expertise to determine whether suitable
reasons could be established by Hilton to overcome this negative
presumption.79
Many of the issues examined in this case have been disputed for
several generations. Almost one hundred and fifty years ago, in
Winans v. Denmead,se the Court, in a five-four decision, identified
the conflict between the statutory requirements of the Patent Act
and the judiciary's liberal construction of patent claims through the
application of equivalents.81 In Winans, the patentee, Ross Winans,
introduced a revolutionary design for a railroad car that vastly
improved coal-hauling efficiency.82 Subsequently, he brought an
action of infringement against Adam, Edward, and Talbot Denmead
based on their railroad car design, that Winans claimed was
substantially the same as his own.83 The patentability of Wmans'
design was never at issue,84 but the scope of the claims was
disputed, with the main question being the equivalency of two
shapes, an octagon and a circle.s5 The Court approached the
infringement question by first querying the structure described in
the claims of the patent, the mode of operation that was employed,
and the result obtained by the mode of operation. 86 The Court then
77. Id. at 1055. A "file wrapper" records "preliminary negotiations between an
applicant and the Patent Office for a patent" BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 628 (6th ed. 1990).
78. Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1054-55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
cautioned lower courts when applying this new presumption. Her concern was that a
post-prosecution phase patent applicant would have received no notice of this presumption
and no incentive to document the reasons behind any changes in the scope of claims made
during prosecution. Id. at 1055.
79. Id.
80. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
81. Hilton II, 62 F3d at 1564 (Nies, J., dissenting).
82. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 332.
83. Id, The defendants' draftsman measured and closely examined Winans' design
prior to building the accused railroad cars. Id.
84. Id. at 338.
85. Id. at 340.
86. ld. at 338. An infringement trial addresses two principle questions: (1) "What is the
definition of the patented invention?" (a question of law for the court), and (2) "Does the
accused device infringe on the invention defined by the court?" (a question of fact submitted
Vol. 36:185
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questioned whether the claims of the specification encompassed
the described mode of operation from which the result was
obtained.7 In its analysis, the Court found that the essence of
patent law is to protect the "mode of operation"88 specified by the
patentee - not to restrict the claims to one particular form
embodying that mode.m The Court acknowledged the patentee's
right to restrict the claims to cover less than what he has invented,
or to limit the claims to one particular form that embodies the
essence of the invention 0 The Court, however, held that it is not
free to impose such a restriction on a patent.91
The majority in Winans based its reasoning on two general
policy statements developed by precedent.92 First, in the absence of
a self-imposed explicit restriction, the patentee should have the
equivalents of his claims protected.9 The Court noted that because
the inventor has "a just right to cover and protect his whole
invention" it is reasonable to presume that he intends to do so.9
Second, in keeping with Constitutional intent to promote progress
in the useful arts,95 and allowing inventors to retain what they
themselves have created, patent specifications are to be construed
liberally.9 In finding that Winans' patent had been infringed, the
majority in Winans announced the essence of all patentees'
arguments on what became to be known as the "rule of
to the jury). I& The court inquires into the structure, mode, and result in defining the
invention patented. Id,
87. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 343-44. In response to these questions, the Court
concluded that Winans had satisfied the statutory requirement of claiming and was,
therefore, entitled to protection for the thing patented "[in] every form in which his invention
may be copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim some of those forms." Id. at 343.
In deciding for Winans, the patentee, the Court found that an octagon was merely a variation
of 'form or proportion" of the circular portion of Winans' car. Id.
88. 1& at 339.
89. Id at 341.
90. Id.
91. Id In support of its rationale, the Court restated a well-known rule that copying a
principle or mode of operation of an invention is an infringement, even though the copy is
completely distinguishable in form or proportion from the original patented invention. Id, at
342. In addition, the Court held that when a patentee describes and claims an invention, his
intent is to cover not only the form described, but all other forms embodying his invention.
Id.
92. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 341.
93. Id,
94. Id, (citation omitted).
95. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl 8.






The dissent in Winans stood squarely opposed to these judicially
interpreted policy statements, arguing in favor of allowing the
language of the patent to set the boundaries of the invention.9
Justice Campbell, writing for the dissent, abhorred the relaxation of
the statutory requirement that a patent must be explained and
"specify and point out" the scope of the invention and the coverage
of the claims with particularity.9 The dissent reasoned that a liberal
reading of patent claims allowing equivalents would fall short of
the Congressional mandate, leading to "costly litigation of
exorbitant and unjust pretensions." 10°
In the cases following Winans during the next century, courts
refined the linguistic framework of infringement analysis, but the
dilemma remained the same - how to resolve the policy struggle
between strict statutory compliance with patent law and liberal
claim construction based on equivalence. In Union Paper-Bag
Mach. Co. v. Murphy,1 1 the Court reversed a decree by the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Missouri,
finding that a knife that cut paper when impacted by a striker was
substantially the same as a cutter that cut paper by the
gravitational action of its own weight.l°2 The main issue in the case
involved the wide differences between the two machines,
specifically in the names and arrangement of their various
components.1°3 In explaining its reasoning, the Court instructed the
fact-finder on remand to look beyond the names of things when
determining similarities or differences.1°4 Rather, the trial court was
asked to examine the various elements and compare "what they do,
... what... function they perform, and how they perform it."105
97. Id. at 343. The Court found it unnecessary for a patentee to explicitly state that
"however its form or proportions may be varied," his claims cover his invention. Id. All
patent claims implicitly cover such variations or "equivalents." Id,
98. Id. at 347 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Campbell, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that by allowing non-literal
interpretation of patent claims, it is difficult for a subsequent inventor or practitioner to
know with certainty that he is not infringing a covered invention Id. The Court inferred that
this uncertainty might lead to excessive litigation to determine whether an infringement has
indeed occurred. Id.
101. 97 U.S. 120 (1877).
102. Union Paper-Bag, 97 U.S. at 125.
103. Id. at 123. The Court detailed differences in the arrangement and form of the
devices composing the operative parts, such as, the cutter assembly, the knife edge, and the
direction of the planer operation. Id.
104. Id, at 125.
105. Id.
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Equivalence is, therefore, established when an accused thing
"performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result [as the claimed thing]. . . ."06 This
now infamous phrase survived virtually intact up to the present
case. 
107
In 1929, the Supreme Court resolved a split between the Seventh
and Third Circuits by its holding in Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v.
Winters v. Dent Hardware Co.108 Winters held a patent for
improvements to a latch used on refrigerator doors'0 He brought
an infringement suit against the Sanitary Refrigerator Co.
("Sanitary") in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, based on the latch mechanism that Sanitary
incorporated into its refrigerators.110 The district court held that
Winters' patent was valid and had been infringed by Sanitary.111
This holding was ultimately affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.112 Dent
Hardware Co. ("Dent") manufactured the latch Sanitary had been
using, and therefore, was joined by Sanitary in the infringement
suit filed by Winters in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
11 3
In this action, the district court also found Winters' patent valid,
but restricted the scope of the claims to their literal construction,
and as a result, found that Dent had not infringed the patent114 The
Third Circuit affirmed and dismissed Winters' appeal, finding no
infringement, as a matter of law. 15
In resolving this conflict, the Supreme Court framed the question
in terms of the scope of Winters' patent, acknowledging that the
infringement issue would be decided as a matter of law, once the
scope of the patent was defined.1 6 The scope of the patent was
found to be dependent upon the proper application of the rule of
106. Id,
107. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1054. Most of the cases employing the tripartite test
language after 1950 trace this phrase from Graver Thnk (see supra note 9) and Sanitary
Refrigerator (see supra note 104) back to Union Paper-Bag (see supra note 98).
108. 280 U.S. 30 (1929).
109. Sanitary Refrigerator, 280 U.S. at 32. On July 19, 1921, the FO issued Patent
No. 1,385,102 to Winters and his co-inventor. Id.
110. Id, at 32-33.
111. Id. at 33.
112. Id
113. Id
114. Sanitary Refrigerator, 280 U.S. at 33.
115. Id. at 34.
116. Id. at 35-36.
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equivalency.1 7  The Court reaffirmed its holding in Union
Paper-Bag., stating that two devices are substantially identical if
they operate "upon the same principle and accomplish the same
result in substantially the same way.""' In applying the rule of
equivalency to the undisputed facts of the case, the Court affirmed
the holding of infringement by the Seventh Circuit and reversed the
holding of non-infringement by the Third Circuit." 9
A modem embodiment of the tension between the statutory
requirements of the Patent Act' 20 and the judicially-developed "rule
of equivalents" can be found in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde
Air Prods. Co. 121 The Court's solution has come to be known as the
"doctrine of equivalents."122 Ironically, one of the stated objectives
of originally permitting the doctrine of equivalents to extend patent
protection to non-literal infringement was to foster statutory
compliance and encourage the very disclosure required by the
Patent Act 12Z The Court reasoned that. if a patentee was exclusively
limited to his literal claims, imitators would be encouraged to make
insubstantial changes that avoided the literal scope of the patent,
thus, robbing the inventor of the benefit of his creativity.124 In turn,
the inventor would have little or no incentive to disclose and every
incentive to conceal, thus, denying society the benefits of a strong
patent system. 125
In Graver Tank, Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, refined
the doctrine of equivalents in affirming the finding of infringement
by the district court and the Seventh Circuit.126 Justice Jackson
clarified the theory underlying the doctrine of equivalents and the
context in which that theory should be applied.127 Relying on
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters'28 and Union Paper-Bag,'29 the
117. Id. at 36.
118. Id. at 41.
119. Sanitary Refrigerator, 280 U.S. at 43.
120. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1996).
121. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
122. 5 DONALD S. ClsuM, PATENTS § 18.02 [21 (1997).
123. Graver 7bnk, 339 U.S. at 607-08.
124. 1d at 607.
125. Id. at 608. In general terms, society benefits from the access to new and useful
technology, exchanging this benefit of use for the grant of patent protection to the developer
of the technology. RoCHEu CooPE' DREmoSS & ROBEirA RosENiAL KWAu, INTEuzcruAL
PROPERTY, TRADEMARK COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW 553 (1996). Consequently, when it gains
access, the public becomes free to improve upon the protected technology, perhaps
advancing the technology even further.
126. Graver 7nk, 339 U.S. at 612.
127. ld. at 608.
128. 280 U.S. 30 (1929).
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Court reiterated that "a patentee may invoke the doctrine [of
equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device if it
performs substantially the same function in substantially the same
way to obtain the same result."13 The Graver Tank Court reasoned
that equivalency is determined in light of the patent itself, the prior
art,131 and the specific circumstances surrounding the case.'32
Another key consideration is whether a reasonable person skilled
in the art would know of the interchangeability (equivalency) of a
substituted element.133 The Court concluded its analysis by holding
that the finding of equivalency is a determination of fact, and
therefore, under the purview of the trial court.3 4
Justice Black dissented,135 voicing the concern that this broad
application of the doctrine of equivalents was contrary to the
statutory requirement of 35 U.S.C. section 33.136 Hence, an
immeasurable burden was placed on the public since it is unable to
ascertain what is within the claims of the patent; and conversely,
what is within the public domain. 137 The dissent argued that proper
application of the doctrine of equivalents would limit its use to
encompass de minimis 38 differences, "colorable only, and without
substance."13
129. 97 U.S. 120 (1877).
130. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280
U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
131. In patent law, "prior art" includes any relevant knowledge, act, description and
patent that pertains to, but predates, [the] invention in question. Prior art may also be used
by a court to invalidate a patent claim, ie., declare the claim is not novel or unobvious. 35
U.S.C. § 102. (1975); BLACK'S LAW DiCToNARY 828 (6th ed. 1990).
132. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609. In Graver Tank, Graver's accused product, a
welding flux, substituted one chemical element (manganese) for the original element
(magnesium) contained in the claimed welding flux of Linde. Id, at 610-11. The Court
examined whether the substitution, under the circumstances and in light of the existing
technology and prior art, was a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of
equivalents inapplicable, or if this change was so insubstantial that the doctrine of
equivalents would prevent Graver from manufacturing and selling its product. I& at 609.
After reviewing the evidence, the Court affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, holding
the substitution was insubstantial, and therefore, infringed Linde's patent Id. at 612.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 609-10.
135. 1d at 613 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black was joined in dissent by Justice
Douglas.
136. Id. at 613 (Black, J., dissenting). Former Title 35 U.S.C. section 33 is currently
codified at 35 U.S.C. section 112 (1975).
137. Graver Tbnk, 339 U.S. at 614 (Black, J., dissenting).
138. "De minimis" is an abridgement of the Latin phrase, "de minimis non curat lex,"
meaning, the law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or trifling matters. BLACK's
LAW DICTONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
139. Graver Thnk, 339 U.S. at 616.
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In the century between Winans and Graver Tank, the arguments
remained static on both sides of this issue. 140 In the forty-five years
since the Graver Tank decision, application of the tripartite test of
"function, way, result," has not been static, but has yielded a
variety of holdings by federal courts, both at the district and
appellate levels. For example, up to and including the present case,
the courts have exhibited some uncertainty on exactly what should
be compared for equivalency - the invention as a whole or the
individual elements composing the invention.'
4 '
The Federal Circuit appeared to clarify this issue in Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States.'4 The court stated that infringement
exists under the doctrine of equivalents if the accused product, as
a whole, performs substantially the same function, in substantially
the same way, to obtain the same result as the claimed product.143
At issue in Hughes was whether Hughes' claimed method of
controlling the velocity and orientation of a spin-stabilized satellite
was infringed by the method employed by the government on
several American communication satellites.' " The trial court judge
focused his application of the doctrine of equivalents on comparing
two specific elements of the claimed and accused methods,
concluding that no infringement occurred because there was no
"obvious or exact equivalent" of the claimed element in the
accused method.'4 The Federal Circuit was highly critical of this
elemental approach,'4 finding that merely establishing the
equivalence of two elements, rather than applying the doctrine of
equivalents to the invention as a whole, was erroneous. 47
Two years later in Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co.,'4 the Federal Circuit reviewed a finding of infringement
against du Pont. 49 The circuit court examined whether the United
140. See generaly Hilton II, 62 E3d at 1563-73 (Justice Nies traced the origin and
history of the doctrine of equivalents in her dissent).
141. 5 CHisuM, supra note 122 at § 18.04, (1), (1)[b][I.
142. 717 F.2d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
143. Hughes, 717 F2d at 1361 (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Id, at 1363.
146. Id. at 1363-64.
147. Hughes, 717 F2d at 1364. This finding reversed the United States Claims Court
holding that the Hughes' patent had not been infringed. Id. Following the disposition of
Warner, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, remanding Hughes to the Federal Circuit for
disposition in light of Warner. Hughes v. United States, 116 F3d 453 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Oral
arguments in Hughes are scheduled for the 1997-98 Federal Circuit term. Id.
148. 224 U.S.P.Q. 409 (Fed Cir. 1984).
149. Id.
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States District Court for the Northern District of Texas erred in its
application of the doctrine of equivalents. 1' ° Atlas claimed that its
patent for an emulsifying agent was infringed by du Pont.151 In
applying the tripartite test of Graver Tank, the district court
compared an individual ingredient in the accused product with the
claimed product, focusing on the "function, purpose and quality" of
the individual ingredient by comparing the finished products.152 This
two-stage (elemental and compound) analysis was sanctioned by
the Federal Circuit as a proper application of the Graver Tank
tripartite test.1
3
In a subsequent case, the Federal Circuit reviewed a finding of
"no infringement" by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia in Pennwalt Corp. v.
Durand-Wayland, Inc.5 4 In Pennwalt, the district court relied
solely on the elemental approach, rejecting the plaintiffs argument
for applying the Graver Tank comparison of the complete patented
and accused devices.' At issue was the equivalency of an element
in Pennwalt's fruit-sorter that relied on a hardwired electronic
network to track the position of the sorted fruit.' The accused
device of Durand-Wayland used a computer with a memory
component as a substitute element to perform the same function.
57
Judge Bissell, writing for the majority, affirmed the trial court's
finding of no infringement. 5 Quoting from Lemelson v. United
States," the court noted that, to achieve a finding of infringement,
"it is well settled that each element of a claim is material and
essential ... and the plaintiff must show the presence of every
element [in the accused device] or its substantial equivalent
" 1 °
This finding merely restates the "all elements rule."' 6' The genesis
150. Id. at 411.
151. Id, at 410.
152. Id, at 416.
153. Atlas Powder, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 416. Although the district court never explicitly
applied Graver 71nk, the Federal Circuit found the test was implicitly satisfied under the
rationale of ACS Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F2d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
The circular reasoning of the ACS Systems court states that "this court will infer findings
that were obviously necessary to the court's opinion." Id, at 1582.
154. 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1731 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
155. Pennwalt, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740-43.
156. Id. at 1738.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1743.
159. 752 E2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
160. Lemyueson, 752 F2d at 1551.
161. "[E]ach element of a patented combination is considered to be material and
essential Thus, the omission of any one of the elements of the claimed combination avoids
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of this rule appears to be in cases discussing the plaintiff's burden
to produce the evidence necessary to prove literal infringement.'6
Specifically, the rule requires that the plaintiff demonstrate that
each element is present in an accused device in order to prove
literal infringement of the patented device.163 Thus, Judge Bissell,
by incorporating the Lemelson holding into his opinion, subsumed
the all elements rule into the doctrine of equivalents, extending it
to encompass the plaintiffs burden in cases of non-literal
infringement, as well.1 4
The four-member dissent in Pennwalt expressed grave concern
about the majority's finding of "no infringement" based on
elemental analysis alone.'6 Senior Circuit Judge Bennett declared
that the majority's opinion implicitly overruled Hughes, even
though Hughes is conspicuously absent from the majority
opinion.1' He continued that "the majority has eviscerated the
underlying rationale of the Graver Tank test" in extending the
elemental analysis burden to cases of non-literal infringement. 67
The dissent concluded that while the majority retained the tripartite
test of Graver Tank, the requirement to compare the claimed and
accused devices as a whole no longer existed.'6
In 1989, in Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A.,
Inc.,'6 the Federal Circuit defined an "element," and how it should
be compared. 70 In Corning, the plaintiffs claimed invention was a
composition and a production method for fused silica optical
waveguide fibers.'7 ' The Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
application of the Graver Tank tripartite test in comparing the
individual limitations (elements) of the accused and claimed
infringement" Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F2d 547, 552 (Ct CL 1976).
162. See generally Autogiro Co. of America v. United States, 384 F.2d 391 (CL CL 1967)
(emphasis added).
163. Interdent, 531 F2d at 552. The United States Court of Claims dismissed
Interdent's claim for damages against the United States for alleged unauthorized use of its
patented invention. Id, The dismissal resulted from Interdent's failure to show equivalence
between each and every element of the accused device and Interdent's protected device. Id.
at 552-54.
164. J. Robert Chambers, Current Developments in Patent Law and Litigation: The
Doctrine of Equivalents, CA15 AU-ABA 209, 213 (1995) (emphasis added).
165. Pennwalt, 4 U.S.PQ.2d at 1743 (Bennett, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1744 (Bennett, J., dissenting). See supra note 147 for the current status of
Hughes.
167. Id. (Bennett, J., dissenting).
168. Id, (Bennett, J., dissenting).
169. 868 F2d 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
170. Corning, 868 F2d at 1259.
171. Id, at 1254.
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devices.1' In doing so, the majority affirmed the holding of
infringement by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. 173 Judge Nies, writing for the majority, found
that a limitation in an accused device could be contained in more
than a single structural component, even though the limitation in
the patented device existed solely in a single distinct structure.
74
By applying Graver Tank in this manner, Corning virtually
renamed Pennwalt's all elements rule as the "all limitations rule."75
Furthermore, the Corning limitations can be defined by combining
various components of the accused device to prove non-literal
infringement of the patented device. 76
In following the evolution of the Graver Tank tripartite test
through the cases preceding Warner, it appears that the Court has
narrowed the doctrine of equivalents considerably. In Hughes, the
Court applied the test to the claimed and accused devices as a
whole.177 In Atlas, the Federal Circuit sanctioned elemental
comparison as a preliminary application of the test to the device as
a whole. 78 In Pennwalt, the Court completely abandoned whole
device comparison in favor of element-by-element analysis. 179
Finally, in Corning, the compared elements are found by the Court
to be limitations defined by single or combined components of the
claimed and accused devices.'
is
The recent history of the limitations applied to the doctrine of
equivalents has been somewhat less dynamic. A basic tenet of
patent theory grants the patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention
encompassed within the scope of his patent.181 Conversely, anything
outside the scope of the patent claims (i.e., subject matter in the
public domain) cannot be claimed to be an "equivalent" during a
subsequent infringement proceeding by invoking the doctrine of
equivalents. 182 Logically, this limitation merely excludes subject
172. Id, at 1261.
173. Id. at 1264.
174. Id, at 1259.
175. See Chambers supra note 164, at 214.
176. Id
177. Hughes, 717 F2d at 1363.
178. Atlas Powder, 224 U.S.PQ. at 409.
179. Pennwalt,4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739-40.
180. Coming, 868 F2d at 1260.
181. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (1996).
182. 5 Ciusum, supra note 122 at § 18.02 at [3] (quoting Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace
Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942)).
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matter not originally claimed by the patentee from being
subsequently claimed. s3
Likewise, restriction of the doctrine of equivalents in the form of
prosecution history estoppel (also termed "file wrapper
estoppel") 1 4 depends on the scope of the claims as originally
defined by the patentee during the prosecution of his application.18
Prosecution history estoppel confines the scope of the subject
matter that can be subsequently claimed as equivalent, based on
changes that the applicant made during prosecution of the patent.
18
In practice, if a patentee changed the scope of his claim(s) to avoid
the prior art, or in response to a PTO action that required the
change to allow the patent, the patentee is estopped from
reclaiming (expanding the claims to include) subject matter
relinquished during prosecution as equivalent during an
infringement proceeding.18 7
Two alternate and opposing theories of applying the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel exist. Each theory begins by
examining the reason underlying the change and the relevance of
the reason to the scope of the claims ultimately allowed. One
theory holds that any change to the claims during prosecution
forms a basis for estoppel.188 The other theory looks behind the
change to the reason for the change to determine if an estoppel
exists. 1 9 Both positions were argued in Warner, with the Supreme
Court seemingly deciding in favor of the latter approach.190 In
creating a rebuttable presumption against the patentee, however, it
appears that the Court has truly merged the wisdom of both
arguments.
Consequently, all changes in the scope of patent claims made
during prosecution of the application are presumed to form the
basis of an estoppel. 191 This presumption can be overcome by a
showing that the changes were made for reasons unrelated to
183. Id.
184. The "file wrapper" or "prosecution history" records the procedural steps taken on
an issued patent application by the FFo. 5 Cmisum, supra note 122 at § 18.05.
185. Id. at 2[a].
186. The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel precludes a patent owner in an
infringement suit from asserting a construction of a claim that would, in effect, resurrect
subject matter surrendered during the course of PTO proceedings. Id,
187. See generally 5 CmsuM, supra note 122 § 18.02 at [3].
188. Hughes, 717 F2d at 1362.
189. Id. at 1362-63 (emphasis added).
190. Warner, 117 S. Ct. at 1050.
191. Id at 1050-51.
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patentability.192
Clearly, the Warner holding will require any person prosecuting a
future patent application to fully document each and every change
made to the scope of the claims during prosecution. Failure to
document could lead to a lack of the evidence needed to nullify the
argument that the excluded subject matter is an equivalent of the
allowed subject matter. This bright line holding of the Supreme
Court will likely lead to more intense negotiations over the reasons
behind each and every change during prosecution between patent
applicants and patent examiners. Ultimately however, the outcome
of those negotiations will be completely documented, and thus, a
reliable source for determining exactly what the inventor claimed
as his invention. This added definition strengthens both the
inventor's rights and the public notice function of current patent
policy.
Unfortunately, the holdings relating to application of the doctrine
of equivalents in Warner are not as helpful, mainly because they do
not provide sufficient clarity on the subject of how the doctrine is
to be applied. In this case, the Court explicitly held that the patent
claims themselves function to define the scope of the patent. 9 It is
also obvious that each element contained within a claim is material
to this definition.194 Furthermore, in defining the elements of the
claims for purposes of non-literal infringement, the Court
apparently would allow the substitution of equivalents for each
element to be implicitly encompassed by the explicit definition. 95
This latter point effectively brings the all elements rule1'9 to the
doctrine of equivalents and marks the end for broad application of
the Graver Tank tripartite test.'97
However, what is not clear is how an element of a patent is now
to be defined in the context of applying the doctrine of equivalents.
In light of the Supreme Court's silence on this point, it appears that
the Federal Circuit's opinion in Corning controls, and "element"
should be considered synonymous with "limitation."198 Recalling the
essential inquiry that Justice Thomas enunciated in Warner, and
192. Id at 1051.
193. Id. at 1049.
194. Id.
195. Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1049.
196. See supra note 161 for an explanation of the "all elements rule."
197. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 E3d 1547 (Fed. Cir.
1997). In this subsequent Federal Circuit case, the court quotes from Warner in applying the
doctrine of equivalents to each claimed element Id. at 1560.
198. See supra note 164.
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substituting "limitation" for "element," the holding of the Court
becomes a little clearer." Moreover, once defined, district and
circuit courts have sufficient latitude to compare individual
elements/limitations using the tripartite test of Graver Tank, or
some other suitable measure of insubstantial difference in
determining equivalence. °°
Through the explicit restatement of the considerations used in
applying the doctrine of equivalents developed in Graver Tank, the
Court provides additional guidance by setting the context for
determining the equivalence of elements.201 Consequently, courts
must determine the purpose, quality and function of ingredients, as
well as whether a reasonably skilled person would know of the
interchangeability of a patented ingredient/component with an
ingredient/component in the accused invention or process.M In
addition, the context of the patent, the prior art, and the specific
circumstances of the case are all necessary factors in comparing
elements for equivalence.2
In light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Warner, it appears
that some changes are in order for patent law practitioners. First,
everyone who prosecutes a patent application will need to fully
document every reason for every change made to a patent claim
during prosecution to preserve evidence for rebuttal. Failure to do
so will result in a narrowed scope of equivalents that can be
claimed in a subsequent infringement proceeding. Second, for those
offering opinions to clients on whether their product or process
infringes a patented product or process, the covered items must be
analyzed in light of Warner. Each element/limitation will have to be
defined and compared to each element/limitation of the client's
product or process. This comparison can be in the form of the
tripartite test of function/way/result or the insubstantial differences
analysis to determine equivalence. While it remains to be seen if
non-literal infringement is more apparent under the elemental
approach of Warner, there will likely remain some equivalents that
will only become clear upon determination during litigation in the
federal courts.
Charles H. Dougherty, Jr.
199. "Does the accused product or process contain limitations identical or equivalent
to each claimed limitation of the patented invention?- Warner, 117 S. Ct at 1054.
200. Id,
201. Id, at 1043.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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